Abstract-Wireless sensor networks are prone to node misbehavior arising from tampering by an adversary (Byzantine attack), or due to other factors such as node failure resulting from hardware or software degradation. In this paper, we consider the problem of decentralized detection in wireless sensor networks in the presence of one or more classes of misbehaving nodes. Binary hypothesis testing is considered where the honest nodes transmit their binary decisions to the fusion center (FC), while the misbehaving nodes transmit fictitious messages. The goal of the FC is to identify the misbehaving nodes and to detect the state of nature. We identify each class of nodes with an operating point (false alarm and detection probabilities) on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. Maximum likelihood estimation of the nodes' operating points is then formulated and solved using the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm with the nodes' identities as latent variables. The solution from the EM algorithm is then used to classify the nodes and to solve the decentralized hypothesis testing problem. Numerical results compared with those from the reputation-based schemes show a significant improvement in both classification of the nodes and hypothesis testing results. We also discuss an inherent ambiguity in the node classification problem which can be resolved if the honest nodes are in majority.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a large number of tiny battery-powered sensors that are densely deployed to sense their environment and report their findings to a central processor (fusion center) over wireless links. Due to size and energy constraints, sensor nodes have limited processing, storage and communication capabilities. In a large network of such sensors many nodes may fail due to hardware degradation or environmental effects. While in some cases a faulty node stops operating altogether, in other cases it may be misbehaving and reporting false data as in the case of stuck-at faults [1] . Sensor networks are also vulnerable to tampering. The networks are envisioned to be distributed over a large geographic area with unattended sensor nodes which may be captured and reprogrammed by an adversary. An adversary can also deploy its own sensor nodes to transmit false data in order to confuse the fusion center (FC). Sensors under an adversary's control are often referred to as Byzantine nodes.
In binary hypothesis testing, in order to lower their bandwidth requirement and energy expenditures, the sensors often make a local decision regarding the state of the hypothesis and only send their binary decision to the FC. Having received the messages from all the nodes, the FC will detect the hypothesis using a judicious decision rule [2] .
The problem of decentralized detection in the presence of Byzantine nodes has been investigated by several authors [3] - [6] . In [4] , it is assumed that through collaboration, the Byzantine nodes are aware of the true hypothesis. The authors formulate the problem in the context of Kullback-Leibler divergence and obtain optimal attacking distribution for the Byzantine nodes using a water-filling procedure. In [5] , the authors consider data fusion schemes in a network under Byzantine attack and propose techniques for identifying the malicious users. In [6] , the authors consider adding stochastic resonance noise at the honest and/or Byzantines in order to enhance the detection performance.
Cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks (CRN) is another example of decentralized hypothesis testing where the secondary (unlicensed) users make a binary decision on whether a channel is vacant of the primary (licensed) user or not, and transmit that decision to the FC. The FC then processes the received data from all the secondary users and decides on the state of the channel. This problem is identical to the classical decentralized detection and recently several papers have considered cooperative spectrum sensing in the presence of Byzantine attacks (spectrum sensing data falsification) [7] - [13] . In [7] , sequential probability ratio test is modified via a reputation-based mechanism in order to filter out the false data and only accept reliable messages. In [12] , the authors present a scheme for identifying the Byzantine nodes and strategies for best fusion rule. In [14] , a method is presented to detect the Byzantine nodes based on how their transmissions compare with those expected from honest nodes. These approaches are often categorized as reputation-based fusion rules [12] , [15] . We note that in cooperative spectrum sensing we may also have more than one class of unreliable nodes. While some malicious users may send false data in order to gain unfair access to the channel, others may be sending incorrect data due to the malfunctioning of their sensing terminal. We should also point out that while a collaborative CRN may consist of at most tens of radios, a sensor network may comprise of hundreds or thousands of nodes. Therefore the proposed algorithms for CRNs may not always be scalable for WSNs. However, the proposed method in this paper is also applicable in the case of cooperative spectrum sensing in CRNs.
In this paper we assume that there may be more than one class of misbehaving nodes. We show that from the point of view of the FC each class can be identified with a (operating) point on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) that corresponds to the decision rule of the sensor nodes in that class. We first estimate the operating points of each class. For a fixed hypothesis vector, we formulate this problem as a maximum likelihood estimation problem with latent variables which correspond to the class identity of the nodes. This problem is then solved using the expectation maximization algorithm. Following this step we detect the class identity of each node and also detect the hypothesis vector.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system model is presented in Section II. In Section III, the proposed node classifier is introduced, and in Section IV, the problem of counterpart networks for node classification is presented. Our performance metrics are introduced in Section V, and numerical results are provided and conclusions are drawn in Sections VI and VII, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless sensor network consisting of nodes employed to detect the state of nature . It is assumed that there are classes of nodes, , where is the class of honest nodes and denote the other classes of (honest or misbehaving) nodes. Each node samples the environment once per unit time and makes a local decision on the state of . It then transmits its binary decision to the FC which, after receiving a number of transmissions from the nodes, attempts to classify the nodes and also decide on the state of .
Denote by the state of at time and let denote the decision of the th node at time regarding the state of . Since all the nodes in a class are identical, the probabilities of detection and false alarm for class are, respectively, given by (1) and (2) As in [4] , [5] , [12] - [14] we assume that the Byzantine nodes do not collaborate. While collaboration can improve the effectiveness of the adversary's attack, it has its own drawbacks. Collaboration requires additional infrastructure such as a FC to coordinate the attacks, as well as increased communication which can quickly deplete the resources of the Byzantine nodes. In the absence of such collaboration, we can assume that, given the hypothesis ( or ), for any time the sensor decisions are conditionally independent [15] - [17] .
In addition, we assume that the sensor decisions across time are conditionally independent given the hypothesis vector , [12] , [14] 1 . From these assumptions it follows that given the hypothesis vector , the sensor decisions are conditionally independent.
While an honest node will transmit its decision to the FC, nodes in other classes may choose to do differently. In particular, let denote the message received at the FC from node at time and define (3) (4) Clearly for honest nodes, and . Let (5) and (6) One may view and as the detection and false alarm probabilities "perceived" by the FC for nodes in class .
Recently in [13] , the authors consider the problem of detecting statistical attacks in cognitive radios using belief propagation. This approach is similar to the reputation-based method of [12] , [15] . The modeling assumptions in [13] are similar but somewhat simpler than those presented here. In particular two types of attackers are assumed. If node is of Type-1, then it attempts to confuse the FC only when hypothesis is detected by sending a 0 with probability and a 1 with probability . On the other hand, if node is of Type-2, it tries to confuse the FC when the detected hypothesis is by sending a 1 with probability and a 0 with probability . Note that corresponds to honest nodes. It is also assumed that there is a subset of trusted nodes whose identities are known to the FC. In contrast, we do not assume that such prior information is available at the FC and our attacker model is more general in that the malicious nodes may try to confuse the FC under both hypotheses. . We show in Appendix A that for other nodes, the operating point is in a region bounded by and , where is the reflection of with respect to the point , i.e., . These nodes can achieve any operating point in this region by choosing appropriate values for and .
III. CLASSIFICATION OF THE NODES
Let , for denote the identification matrix of the nodes where if and 0, otherwise. To identify the nodes, the FC collects messages from each node and stores them in a matrix subsequently referred to as the decision matrix. Using the decision matrix the FC must detect the identification matrix and the hypothesis vector . The maximum likelihood detection rule for is given by (7) Evaluation of (7) requires the likelihood function which is computed below. For a given hypothesis vector , denote the number of 's and 's in by and , respectively. Also denote the number of correct decisions of the th node on hypotheses and by and , respectively. In other words, out of occurrences of in , node correctly detects of them, and out of occurrences of in , it correctly detects of them. We note that for a given hypothesis vector , and can be calculated from the th row of . We have, (8) where is the probability of correct rejection. It can be seen from (8) that the likelihood function depends on the unknown parameters for . Therefore for the detection problem in (7) the Bayesian or the Neyman-Pearson rule cannot be implemented. Generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) is often used in detection problems with unknown parameters [18] . However, for our problem GLRT is not mathematically tractable. Therefore, in this paper, we follow the following process. For a given hypothesis vector we first estimate the operating points for . Using the estimated operating points, we can implement the maximum a posteriori (MAP) classification rule for . The estimated operating points and identification matrix are then used to implement the maximum likelihood detection rule for the hypothesis vector . We have not been able to prove the optimality of the proposed method due to its mathematical intractability. In Section VI our simulation results are compared with the Cramer-Rao lower bound and show a close match.
A. Estimation of Class Parameters
From (8), it is evident that to detect we need to first estimate the operating points for . Note that in the following it is assumed that the hypothesis vector is fixed and all the probabilities are conditioned on . For ease of notation, however, we drop this condition from our notations.
In addition to the operating points of each class, the FC is also unaware of the fraction of nodes in each class. Let denote the probability that node belong to class and define the matrix of class parameters, , where its th row is given by (9) We would like to estimate the class parameters from the observation matrix . Since the conditional probability is not given, we may write the maximum likelihood estimate for as,
This may be viewed as a mixture model (with as the latent variables since the nodes are not identified) and can be effectively solved using the iterative Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm [19] . Let us define the log-likelihood function, (11) Due to the fact that is latent, with EM we consider the conditional expectation of (11) under the posterior distribution of given and . This is the expectation step of EM. In the maximization step, this expectation is maximized with respect to . Denote the current and the revised estimate of by and , respectively. The two steps of EM algorithm are described below.
1) Expectation: Using the current estimate of the matrix of class parameters, , find the posterior distribution of given and . Using this distribution find the expectation of the log likelihood function in (11) for an arbitrary given by (12) 2) Maximization: Revise the estimate of class parameters to maximize the expectation calculated in the previous step, i.e., let (13) It has been shown that each update of the EM algorithm is guaranteed to increase the log-likelihood function [20] . This implies that the EM algorithm will converge regardless of the ini-tial value of , [19] , [21] . We now present the two steps of EM algorithm for the problem at hand. (14) To calculate in (12) for the expectation step, one should find the conditional expectation of with respect to . Hence, (15) We now need to perform the maximization step in (15) . Denoting , we have (16) where,
and where (the th row of ) is the current vector of parameters for the th class. The quantity can be interpreted as the probability that class is responsible for the decisions made by the th node. So, the effective number of nodes assigned to class , denoted by , is given by, (18) The estimation of the probability of correct rejection and the probability of detection for any can be found by solving (13) as, (19) (20) which after some manipulations results in, (21) (22) Finally, we should maximize with respect to with the constraint that . This can be achieved using Lagrange multiplier method by maximizing the Lagrangian (23) We have (24) Multiplying both sides by and summing over we get which results in (25) Since the function is concave and , , it can be seen from (15) that is a concave function of 's (in ). This followed by the fact that the constraint is linear in 's implies that the Lagrange multiplier method in (24) achieves the optimal solution [22] .
B. Classification of the Nodes
Let denote the matrix of class parameters estimated by the EM algorithm. Given , the conditional probability that node belongs to class is given by (26) where is the th row of . The denominator in (26) is independent of . Therefore, the maximum a posteriori classification rule for node (given ) is given by (27) and we set for for .
C. Estimation of the Hypothesis Vector
In the previous section we showed how to estimate the class parameters and obtain the node identification matrix for a given hypothesis vector . Therefore, in the sequel we denote these parameters by and . Similarly , , , and are substituted by , , , and , respectively. The maximum likelihood detection rule for obtained from the observation matrix given and is now given by (29) where, (30) and where is the th row of denoting the estimated parameters of the th class for the hypothesis vector . The final estimation of all the network parameters is given by where and . The entire procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1. 
D. Complexity
For a given hypothesis vector, the EM algorithm is very fast and converges in only a few steps. However, for a vector of decisions from the sensors the EM algorithm must be performed times corresponding to the possible hypothesis vectors. This increases the complexity of the algorithm exponentially in terms of the observation interval. However, as discussed in the numerical section, the proposed algorithm converges much faster than the reputation-based algorithms in terms of the number of observation samples (A brief description of the reputation-based algorithms is provided in Appendix B). Another point to observe is that the rate at which the state of nature changes is much lower than the rate at which the sensors sample the environment. In other words, during an observation time of decisions from the sensors, the state of nature will not change more than a few times. In such a case the number of vectors for which the EM algorithm is performed is only polynomial in . For example, in order to detect a single change in (from to or vice versa), EM is performed for only possible vectors . Furthermore, the complexity of the proposed algorithm is linear in the number of nodes and quadratic in the number of classes . Given that sensor networks are expected to consist of hundreds or thousands of nodes, the linear complexity in the number of nodes is significant.
IV. COUNTERPART NETWORKS
In this section we will show that any decision matrix is equally likely to be generated by one of two different networks which we refer to as counterpart networks. For any matrix of class parameters we can define a counterpart matrix, , whose th row, , is given by
Also define the counterpart hypothesis vector, where is a vector of all ones with length . It can be verified that,
The intuition behind (32) is that the probability of transmitting a one (or a zero) for a node with the operating point under , is the same as a node with the operating point under . Therefore any observed decision matrix is equally likely to be generated by one of two networks, namely under the hypothesis vector , or under the hypothesis vectors . This implies that regardless of the method used, there are always two solutions for the estimation of the class parameters and the detected hypothesis vector.
The ambiguity described above can be resolved by assuming some prior information on the network. In practice, the operating point of the honest nodes will be above the chance line [23] . If it is known that the class of honest nodes is the largest class, then the ambiguity can be resolved by choosing the solution for which the largest class is above the chance line.
V. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT METRICS
To assess the performance of classifiers, two metrics of discriminability and reliability are often used [24] . Discriminability shows how well the classifier distinguishes the different classes, whereas reliability indicates how well the posterior probability that a node belongs to a class is estimated by the proposed method. To show the discriminability of the classifier, we define the misclassification rate by, [20] , (33) Similarly the performance of our hypothesis detection scheme is evaluated by the hypothesis discriminability given by (34)
To estimate the accuracy of the estimation of the nodes' operating points we define the following measure based on the normalized Euclidean distance between the estimated and actual operating points, i.e., (35) Note that the three measure in (33)-(35) are appropriately normalized so as to be in the interval .
A. The Cramer-Rao Bound
To evaluate the efficacy of the expectation maximization algorithm in estimating the class parameters we would like to compare our results with the Cramer-Rao lower bound (CRLB). However, computation of CRLB for our estimation problem is difficult due to the mixture model which involves the latent variables and the hypothesis vector . However, CLRB can be computed for the case that the identification matrix and the hypothesis vector are known. This provides a lower bound to the estimation errors of the proposed method in which and are not assumed to be known a priori. 
where is a column vector of all 's with length . Unbiasedness of the proposed algorithm has been shown through extensive simulations some of which is presented in Section VI. For known and , we have 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, employing the metrics in Section V, we evaluate the performance of the proposed method referred to as maximum-likelihood classifier (MLC) and also compare our results with the reputation-based classifier (RBC) algorithm [12] , [26] . In RBC when the network parameters (e.g., the nodes' operating points) are known, the optimal -out-of-rule can be computed (see for example [16] , [27] ). However, when the FC is not aware of all the network parameters as is the case here, majority rule has been used in [12] and is also used here for our comparisons. In addition, in (45) the threshold can be set following a Neyman-Pearson criterion, for example by setting a threshold on the probability of misclassifying the honest nodes as Byzantines. Moreover, if the fraction of honest nodes is known to the FC as in [12] , then can be set to minimize the probability of classification error. In our case, however, the FC is not aware of the fraction of honest nodes. Therefore we set the threshold . For this choice of the probability that an honest node is misclassified as Byzantine is the same as the probability that a Byzantine node is misclassified as honest. Other values of the threshold can favor the classification of honest nodes as Byzantines or vice versa.
Simulation results are obtained from at least independent trials. The EM algorithm is assumed to have converged when . Moreover, to overcome the ambiguity of the counterpart networks, we assume that the honest nodes are in majority. This implies that for a network consisting of two classes the break down point of the algorithm is at 50% [28] . In Figs. 1, 2 and 9-12 where a performance metric is presented versus , the number of possible hypothesis vectors is too large to evaluate (29) exhaustively. Therefore in these cases it is assumed that during the observation period there is at most one change in the hypothesis vector which may occur at random anywhere from time 2 to . This assumption, which as mentioned in Section III-D is applicable in practice, is only made to reduce the computational complexity of our simulations. However, the efficacy of the proposed method is not affected by this assumption as other figures verify.
Three sets of operating points, denoted OP1, OP2 and OP3, are considered. Table I shows the class parameters corresponding to each operating point. For OP1 and OP2 there are two classes of honest and Byzantine nodes. The FC perceives the operating point of the Byzantines, , to be that listed in Table I . One may view the Byzantines as having an actual operating point , but flipping their decisions before transmission to the FC. Comparing the operating point of honest nodes and the actual operating point of Byzantine nodes in OP2 reveals that the Byzantine nodes are more capable of detecting the event under both hypotheses (i.e., with smaller probability of false alarm and higher probability of detection). For OP3, four classes of nodes are considered. The first class with the operating point comprises the honest nodes. The second class are Byzantine nodes with the operating point , while the third and fourth classes are "almost-always-yes" and "almost-always-no" nodes. The almost-always-yes nodes try to convince the FC that the hypothesis is by transmitting a 1 most of the times, and increase the overall false alarm rate of the system. In contrast, the almost-always-no nodes transmit a 0 most of the time and decrease the overall probability of detection. Figs. 1 and 2 show the performance of the classifiers versus the number of received decisions, . It is evident that the accuracy of node classification and the estimation of the operating points improve with . Moreover the proposed algorithm converges much faster than the reputation-based method requiring fewer number of observation samples. Note that since RBC can only discriminate nodes into two classes, in the case of OP3
is not defined. The figures also show that the performance of classifiers for OP1 is better than for OP2 and OP3. The reason is that the misbehaving nodes are more capable in the latter two cases. In particular in the case of OP2, the RBC method fails completely. This is due to the fact that even though only 40% of the nodes are Byzantine, because of their operating point versus the operating point of the honest nodes , collectively the Byzantine nodes are more capable than the honest nodes and can mislead the FC.
Figs. 3 and 4 compare the performance of the classifiers versus the ratio of the honest nodes to the total number of nodes (denoted by ) for . The operating points are OP1 and OP2 shown in Table I . As expected the performance of the classifiers improves with . It is seen that while RBC can effectively classify the nodes in the case of OP1, the computation of the operating points is not very accurate. Moreover for OP2 the performance of RBC is not acceptable and fails completely for . In Figs. 5-7 we compare the performance of the classifiers versus the number of nodes for samples. For OP1, as the number of nodes increases, the classifier errors converge to zero. Again for OP2, the error for RBC does not converge to zero due to the fact that in this case the Byzantine nodes are collectively more capable than the honest nodes.
Figs. 8 and 9 show the efficacy of the proposed estimation method by comparing the variance of the estimated false alarm probability of the honest nodes and the Cramer-Rao lower bound of Section V-A. As these figures demonstrate, the accuracy of the estimation increases as number of observations or number of nodes increases.
To show the robustness of the proposed method to possible time varying behavior of the Byzantine nodes, we consider a case where the Byzantines change their operating point during the observation period. Two classes of nodes are considered. The honest nodes have an operating point . For Byzantine nodes, for each time , the probabilities of false alarm and detection are chosen at random with uniform distribution on and , respectively. Moreover, these probabilities are independent for each time and for each node. Finally the fraction of the Byzantine nodes is . Figs. 10-12 show , and versus , respectively. In evaluating for Byzantines we have compared the mean of their operating point given by with the estimated operating point. We also show the results for the case where the operating point of the Byzantines is fixed and is equal to . It can be seen that, as in the case of fixed operating points, the proposed method outperforms the RBC method. Moreover, the performances are very close for the two cases of fixed and randomly varying operating points. This can be explained by the fact that the estimation of probabilities of false alarm and detection in EM are obtained by evaluating the average number of ones transmitted under and as shown in (21) and (22).
VII. CONCLUSION
We consider the problem of decentralized detection in the presence of one or more classes of misbehaving nodes. The fusion center first estimates the nodes' operating points (false alarm and detection probabilities) on the ROC curve and then uses this estimation to classify the nodes and to detect the state of nature. We formulate and solve this problem in the framework of expectation maximization algorithm. Numerical results are presented that show the proposed algorithm significantly outperforms the reputation-based methods in classification of the nodes as well as the detection of the hypotheses. The estimated operating points are compared to the Cramer-Rao lower bound which shows the efficacy of the proposed method.
APPENDIX
Operating Region of Misbehaving Nodes: Consider a node in class with the operating point on its ROC curve. We show that by appropriate selection of and in (5)-(6), a desired operating point can be achieved in the region bounded by and where . Consider Fig. 13 . Denote by the operating point of a node and by the reflection of at . We consider two cases.
Fixed
: From (5) and (6), for fixed we get
where is the slope of the line between the origin and . Therefore in this case is located on a set of parallel lines with slope and the -intercept starting from the origin (corresponding to ) up to (corresponding to ).
: Similar to the previous case, for fixed and using (5) and (6), one can write (42) where is the slope of line . As a result, in this case the region of operating points is a set of parallel lines with slope and the -intercept starting from the origin ( ) and up to ( ). Combining the two cases above we see that the loci of the operating point of the node will be in the parallelogram where points and correspond to and , respectively. Consider a Byzantine node in class . With its transmitted message , this node attempts to mislead the FC regarding the state of . For this, however, the Byzantine must first detect the sate of as represented by . There is an ROC and an operating point (denoted by in Section II) associated with this detection rule. Since the transmitted message must be based on this detection ( ), the above results show that the operating point as perceived by the FC cannot be arbitrary and must lie in the region described above.
Reputation-Based Node Classifier: Voting rules or -out-of-rules [2] are commonly employed in the FC to detect the occurrence of an event in decentralized sensing [10] , [11] , [26] , [29] , [30] . Based on this rule, the detected hypothesis is if at least out of nodes vote in favor of this event. When , and , this rule is denoted by "OR-rule", "AND-rule", and the "Majority-rule", respectively.
The operating point of the th node, , can be estimated using the transmitted decisions of the node under the estimated hypothesis, i.e., (43) (44) where is the detected hypothesis from the voting rule at time , and is the corresponding transmitted decision of the th node.
The reputation-based classification [12] is based on the reputation metric, , given by (45)
In other words, a node belongs to the class of honest nodes if the fraction of its decisions that do not match the detected hypotheses is less than some threshold .
